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AGENT-BASED ECONOMY
PAOLO PELLIZZARI
Abstract. In an agent-based exchange economy, we measure the
loss of wealth for rational agents due to the presence of varying
proportions of subrational (boundedly rational) traders that do
not know all the needed parameters. We consider two departures
from rationality: M-traders use private, stochastic and unbiased
signals to build an estimate of the value of the risky asset; chartists
only use the last observed price. The exchange takes place using a
realistic continuous double auction.
We show by numerical simulations that M-traders’ subrational
behavior does not reduce the wealth of the rational agents. On
the contrary, a sizable fraction of chartists can lead to mispricing
of the risky asset and to a reduction of the wealth share of the
rational traders. Moreover, as chartists perceive a higher wealth
than the others, due to wrong estimates of the fundamental value,
their fraction in the market may not dissolve in the long run.
1. Introduction
The classic approach in ﬁnancial economics is based on the assump-
tion of fully rational agents that are able to acquire and process all
the relevant information to compute the equilibrium price of risky as-
sets traded in the market. The knowledge of the relevant parameters
and of the preferences of the agents suﬃces to attain an eﬃcient al-
location of risk. There are huge conceptual and analytical advantages
in taking such a rational viewpoint where agent select their optimal
endowments maximizing their expected utility. There are also a few
heroic assumptions and lack of ﬁt with empirical data.
We avoid in this paper the slippery assumption that all agents cor-
rectly know the distribution of the risky asset and the preferences (i.e.,
risk tolerance coeﬃcients) of the other traders. We deﬁne a sensi-
ble way to build beliefs about the fundamental values on the part
of the non-rational agents as well as embed exchange in a realistic
Date: This version: March 13, 2008.
Key words and phrases. Risk sharing; boundedly rationality; cost of subrational
trading, agent-based markets.
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trading process (other than the preternatural Walrasian auction) that
can shepherd the agents toward an eﬃcient allocation. The computa-
tional agent-based models developed in the last decade appear to be
useful to overcome analytical diﬃculties arising when detailed multi-
agent and interactive environments are studied. Good surveys are
[LeBaron, 2006, Hommes, 2006].
We are interested in quantifying the extent of the social loss that
rational agents suﬀer because of the presence of less than rational
traders. A strong motivation to study this issue is related to the im-
pressive explosion of non-informational based trading in the markets
in the past decades. In a broad sense, any trading strategy which is
not based on fundamental research aiming at the risk-adjusted maxi-
mization of proﬁts, can be dubbed subrational. Think, say, to momen-
tum or index funds that programmatically ignore fundamental anal-
ysis to keep positions based on past returns or passive replication of
the market portfolio. Scholars and practitioners are well aware that
there may be good reasons to cease to be rational: based on evidence,
passive investing is cheap, most fundamental mutual funds are unable
to attain similar results and momentum strategies appear to reap ex-
cess returns (albeit for reasons that may still look puzzling or fuzzy).
[Grinblatt et al., 1995] shows that 77% of mutual funds actually em-
ploys some form of momentum stock picking to assemble their portofo-
lios. On the theoretical side, in [De Long et al., 1990] it is shown that
irrational agents can gain higher returns than rational traders (but
lower risk-adjusted returns); [Hong and Stein, 1999] argue that mo-
mentum traders can proﬁt of news underreaction (even in risk-adjusted
terms, see [Chan et al., 1996]). These reasons explain why we prefer
the term “subrational” to “irrational” in this work.
It is intuitive, however, that the widespread neglect of fundamental
research and information processing could lead to poor pricing with
related deﬁcient risk allocation, bad credit allotment and waste of ﬁ-
nancial resources. Many other agent-based papers have investigated
the eﬀects of the coexistence of diﬀerent strategies and various behav-
ioral “biases”, since the seminal work of [Day and Huang, 1990]. Most
of the work, however, focus on asset pricing anomalies or statistical
properties of the resulting time-series that are generated by agents’
heterogeneity and robust interaction. [Brock and Hommes, 1998] is a
semi-analytical model that shows how boundedly rational agents with
heterogeneous beliefs can produce chaotic prices, see also [Chiarella and
He, 2001]. The Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market, [Arthur et al., 1997],
is another inﬂuential model of a market with heterogeneous and learn-
ing agents that generate simulated time-series with “psychologically
rich” price behavior and persistent deviations from the homogeneous
rational expectation equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, muchTOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 3
smaller consideration has been given to wealth eﬀects and social losses
that may arise in the presence of boundedly rational subpopulations.
In this paper, we consider two diﬀerent markets where rational agents
coexist with two breeds of subrational agents, named M-traders and
chartists. All the agents share the same demand function but the M-
traders do not know the fundamental value of the risky asset and re-
ceive/process a stream of unbiased stochastic signals to build an es-
timate of the unknown quantity. The chartists just use the price to
guess the fundamental value. We investigate whether and how vary-
ing proportions of subrational traders aﬀect the certainty equivalent
of the rational agents. A natural benchmark to use is the fair share
(FS) of wealth, that is the amount of certainty equivalent that rational
agents would get in a Walrasian world entirely void of any subrational-
ity. In order to get a broader perspective we present our results in 4
parts, inquiring into the convergence of price, the extent of the mis-
pricing possibly occurring, the fraction of FS that is ultimately secured
by rational traders and, ﬁnally, the reasons that could foster ongoing
subrational behavior.
Our ﬁndings can be abridged in two statements:
(1) M-traders are not harmful to rational agents;
(2) Markets populated by chartists often converge to the wrong
equilibrium, producing a visible mispricing when the fraction of
subrational traders is large; the fair share of the rational agents
is rather volatile in these markets and this could result in severe
losses with positive probability; even though chartists earn less
fair share than the rational agents, they perceive a much higher
share of wealth due to their wrong (but self-reinforcing) beliefs
and consequently there are reasons to trust in their persistence
in the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
describes the microstructural environment used by the agents. In the
third section, we show and discuss the results, with several subsections
devoted to the aforementioned 4 issues. The ﬁnal Section summarizes
and oﬀers some reﬂections and policy implications.
2. The model
We consider a standard exchange economy where a risky stock paying
a random amount Y ∼ N(µ,σ2) in the far future T can be traded for
cash1. In the rest of the paper, we will deﬁne µ as fundamental value
of the stock.
The economy is populated by N CARA traders endowed with some
initial amount of cash ci0 and units of stock si0, i = 1,...,N. The i-th
1Equivalently, we could consider a risky stock and a risk-free bond paying an interest
rate r. In our setup we have r = 0.4 PAOLO PELLIZZARI
trader has the following excess demand function for the risky asset at
price p
qit(p) = kiτ(µ(i,t) − p) − sit, (1)
where τ = 1/σ2 is the precision of the payoﬀ, ki is the risk tolerance
coeﬃcient, sit is the number of risky units at time t and µ(i,t) denotes
the expected average realization value of the risky asset that may vary
across agents and depends for each agent on a sequence of possibly
stochastic signals − → w it = {wij},i = 1,...,N,j = 1,...,t:
µ(i,t) = µ(i,− → w it).
We name rational the agents that know and use the true parameters
in their demand functions. In the presence of rational agents, well-
known work, see [Wilson, 1968], shows that there is a unique eﬃcient
allocation. In other words, if µ(i,t) ≡ µ the equilibrium price is given
by p∗ = µ − S/(τK), where K =
P
i ki and S =
P
i si0 are the sum of
agents’ risk tolerance coeﬃcients and the total quantity of risky asset.
Despite the existence of this eﬃcient allocation, it is still interest-
ing to discuss whether rational agents can attain it in practical sit-
uations, given that the computation of p∗ and of the optimal risky
endowments requires S and K. In particular, the knowledge of K is
tricky as no agent can conceivably know all the risk tolerances of his
peers in the market. Moreover, no agent knows at the inception of
trading if he should be a net buyer or seller, as his ﬁnal endowment de-
pends ultimaltely on the endowments and risk tolerances of the other
traders. In [LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2007], however, it is shown that
agents equipped with demand functions (1) are able to reach the ef-
ﬁcient allocation in ﬁnite time, randomly attempting a purchase or a
sell at each time t, if µ(i,t) ≡ µ for all agents. This result is robust to
variations in the trading protocol.
More realistically, we also consider here traders that have imperfect
knowledge of the true underlying economic fundamental µ. Hereafter,
we call these agents subrational. They adapt to the environment in
the sense that time is needed to build some knowledge about the ini-
tially unknown parameter µ. Let wij be a doubly indexed sequence
of independent and identically distributed signals with correct mean µ
and variance σ2
w. We take into consideration two kinds of subrational
agents with diﬀerent mechanisms to deﬁne µ(i,t):
(1) M-traders (M stands for µ and Much More): agents recursively
update their estimate of µ with an adjustment term dependent
on the last observed signal
µ(i,t + 1) = µ(i,t) + λ(wi,t+1 − µ(i,t)). (2)
If 0 ≤ λ < 2, the AR(1) process for µ(i,t) is stationary, its








Observe that standard invertibility results ensure that it is pos-
sible to write the process as a function of past innovations con-
tained in − → w i,t+1.
In the next section we will consider three representative val-
ues for λ:
(a) λ = 0.5: the estimated fundamental value µ(i,t) is a weighted
average of past signals, with more weight given to more re-
cent elements of − → w it;
(b) λ = 1: M-traders myopically set µ(i,t) to the last observed
signal, forgetting all the past;
(c) λ = 1.5: M-traders exhibit a form of overreaction to the
last signal, putting negative weight on the previous value
of µ(i,t).
We believe these instances are interesting because they shed
some light on three frequently studied ﬂavours of irrational be-
havior.
(2) Chartists: a huge number of research papers suggest that some
form of chartist behavior is used by many traders. This means
that prices are used as signals, say because the agents have not
the capability to get the right µ or process the proper piece
of information wit or want to free-ride other agents, bypassing
the cost of information acquisition. We suppose that the last
(observed) closing price ¯ pt is used to build a rough estimate of
the right fundamental2 value µ.
As the price, say ¯ pt, is valid for a unit transaction (see below
for the details on the market functioning), the agent pragmati-
cally inverts his demand function
±1 = kiτ(µ − ¯ p) − si
to get µ (we drop the time index for clarity). Assuming that ¯ p
is the local equilibrium price, given his endowment si, he can





2There are other appealing ways to model the use of a pseudo-signal like ∆pt =
pt − pt−1 or Rt = pt/pt−1 in order to estimate the unknown equilibrium price p∗.
Agents could, for example, conjecture that the same return will persist for d periods
and could build at time t the estimate
p∗ = ptRd
t.
This could in turn be used to guess whether the risky position should be increased
or decreased.6 PAOLO PELLIZZARI








Observe that this estimate would be accurate had the trans-
action occurred at a price ¯ p close to p∗ and provided that the
stock to risk tolerance ratio of the market is close to that of the
agent. However, random departures from the equilibrium price
and/or misalignments of the risk borne by the agent and the
market as a whole yield grossly fallacious estimate of ˆ µ
In the following we assume that a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2 of traders is
either made of M-traders or chartists, while the remaining portion is
made of rational traders with µ(i,t) ≡ µ in (1). We refer to markets
where there are rational agents and M-traders (chartists) as M-trader
markets (chartist markets).
We are interested in measuring the global eﬃciency of the market
and, in particular, to quantify the amount of utility that is lost because
of the the presence of the subrational agents. This is meant to assess the
extent of the cost that the rational agents bear due to the (sub)behavior
of the others.
The comparison of the certainty equivalents3 of the rational and sub-
rational agents allows to gauge the relative performances of the two
groups.
In the case of M-trader markets, we have that
E[µ(i,t)] = µ,
for all agents. Subrational agents are able to correctly infer the funda-
mental value on average but there is scope for endogenous ﬂuctuations
3In a CARA-normal setup, the certainty equivalent of the i-th agent at time t is
given by







In a Walrasian world, where each trader ends up with cash c∗
i = ci0 − p∗(s∗
i − si0)
and s∗
i = (S/K)ki units of stock, after exchanging at the equilibrium price p∗ in a












We refer to m∗
i as the fair share, with the name recalling that this would be the
ﬁnal outcome in a ﬁctitious and idealized Walrasian setup. If any other market
protocol is used to exchange the risky asset, the ﬁnal certainty equivalent m(i,T)
of an individual trader can be diﬀerent from his/her fair share m∗
i, either because
the agent is holding the wrong amount siT 6= s∗
i of risky stock or because the ﬁnal
cash ciT 6= c∗
i.
The perceived certainty equivalent π(i,t) is obtained when the perceived µ(i,t)
replaces µ in (5):
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of individual estimates µ(i,t) that is going to decrease the certainty
equivalents (or, interchangeably, the utilities) of some traders.
In the case of chartist estimation of ˆ µ using the observed price, there
is no theoretical guarantee that all the µ(i,t) converge to the correct
fundamental value. Moreover, we can verify that the following self-
reinforcing mechanism could generate persistent deviations from the
correct valuation of the risky asset. Assume that α >> 0 (suﬃciently
big) and that for purely random reasons a large price ¯ p is observed in
the previous trading session. The chartist traders implicitly will herd
on a relatively large estimate for ˆ µ. The belief of a large fundamental
value triggers the submission of large bids, that are likely to ﬁnd a
counterpart in the set of rational traders, and large asks that have a
smaller probability to be executed. This excess demand might sustain
or increase further the price level so that prolonged departures from
the equilibrium price are observed. The positive feed-back cycle is
eventually broken by the budget constraints that avoid a perpetual
buy frenzy.
2.1. The market microstructure. In each trading session, agents
are randomly selected (without resampling) to submit a limit order
for a unit quantity. Hence, the left hand side of (1) is either +1
(attempt to buy one more unit) or -1 (attempt to sell one piece of
stock). The side of the order is independently chosen with equal prob-
ability. This is consistent with the idea that agents do not know if
they should be net buyers or sellers. Of course, risk tolerant (averse)
agents with few (many) stocks would randomly produce very aggressive
(unattractive) bids and rather unattractive (aggressive) asks, in such
a way that their probability to increase (decrease) their stock endow-
ments is large. We assume that agents are budget constrained: they
cannot bid more than the available cash and they cannot try to sell
units they do not own. A similar environment is discussed at length in
[LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2007].
Without loss of generality, assume that an agent must submit a order
to buy. The reservation price p0 is computed, given his µ(i,t) and sit
from the demand equation (1)
1 = kiτ(µ(i,t) − p
0) − sit yielding p




Submitting the above reservation price is a dominated strategy as, were
the order executed at that price, there would be no increment in the
certainty equivalent. Hence, the agents bid by shading their true reser-
vation value using a limit price uniformly sampled in [p00,p0] where
p




In words, the agent tries to get a discount by posting a random order
with a more favorable limit price. He bids an amount that is in the
right neighborhood of the price p00 valid for the purchase of two units
(but still the order is valid for one unit). This mechanism is a less
extreme instance of the device used in [Gode and Sunder, 1993], where
agents with reservation price vi bid randomly in [0,vi]. The case of a
seller is dealt with obvious modiﬁcations.
The market platform is a standard continuous double auction where
limit orders, valid for one unit, can be posted on the the bid or ask
books. If an order is not executed immediately it is stored in the proper
book for future use. At any time, the orders to buy (sell) are kept
ordered in the bid- (ask-)book in the standard decreasing (increasing)
price-time priority, so that b1 (a1) denote the best bid (ask). A new
buy (sell) order with limit price b (a) is executed if b ≥ a1 (a ≤ b1), the
two matching orders are cancelled and the cash/stock endowments of
the seller/buyer are updated. Then another agent is sampled and the
process continues until all the agents have submitted their limit orders.
At the end of each trading session, indexed by t = 1,...,T, the
closing price ¯ pt (to be used by chartists) is recorded and the book is
cleared.
3. Results
This section presents the results obtained by simulation of the previ-
ously described markets. We investigate 4 main themes: the eventual
convergence of the price to some stable level, the extent of the mis-
pricing with respect to the equilibrium price, the fraction of the fair
share that is retained by the rational traders and a comparison of (the
wealth of) the two groups of agents. Hence the following 4 subsections
seek to answer the questions
(1) Does the price ultimately converge?
(2) What’s the magnitude of the mispricing with respect to the
theoretical equilibrium price?
(3) How is the wealth of the rational traders aﬀected by a varying
proportion of subrational ones?
(4) Is there any reason justifying the prolonged existence of M-
trader or chartist subrationality?
The discussion is based on 100 simulations for each of the two markets.
In each run, lasting T = 500 days (trading sessions), a random value
for α is sampled in [0,0.5] or, equivalently, 0 ≤ 100α ≤ 50 percent
of agents behave subrationally. Diﬀerent batches of simulations are
disjointly performed for the two types of behavior we have considered
in (2) and (4). All the parameters used in the simulations, with a brief
description, are listed in Table 3.TOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 9
Param. Value Description
µ 1000 Constant fund. value
σ2 120 Payoﬀ variance
σ2
w 240 Variance of the signal process
T 500 Trading sessions per simulation
N 1000 Number of agents
c0i 50000 Initial cash endowment
s0i {20,...,80} Random initial stock endowment
κi {10,...,40} Random risk tolerance
Table 1. Values of the parameters used in the simula-
tion, with a brief description.
3.1. Convergence. M-traders are diﬀerent from chartists in two fun-
damental ways. The former group is using a stochastic signal to build a
tentative valuation of the asset and, hence, to post limit orders. More-
over, each M-traders uses private and distinct (unbiased) information
in (2). All the members of latter group, conversely, use a public signal
(the price ¯ p) to build diﬀerent estimates of the fundamental value that
is needed to provide limit orders. Observe that no random variable is
involved in this process as ¯ p is taken as given.
We expect a noisy price time series and ever-lasting trades at least in
the M-trader populated market. Table 2 depicts the percent standard
deviation of the price in the last 100 days, for various levels of α. In
this and all the subsequent tables we computed the mean ˆ e(α) of the
quantity of interest using a non parametric smoother. Then we provide
the values ˆ e(0.1),..., ˆ e(0.5). Pre-subscripting the index r = 1,...,100
to the quantities obtained in the r-th simulation, we report the entries






ω(|rα − α|)sd(rpt,t = 401,...,500)/rp
∗,
in which the speciﬁc form of the weights ω(|rα − α|) depends on the
selected smoother and sd(·) is the standard deviation of the sequence
in the argument.
The dispersion of the price is bounded away from zero in all the
M-traders’ markets and is also monotonically increasing in λ. This is
coherent with the dependence of the variance (3) on λ. The left panel
of Figure 1 shows indeed a “thermal” noise around the equilibrium level
due to the stochastic adjustment of µ(i,t) performed by the M-traders
that keep exchanging marginal units.
The last row of Table 2 shows that, conversely, very little price dis-
persion is observed in markets populated with chartists. The right part
of Figure 1 is depicting two cases (where α = 0.19 and 0.33). The price10 PAOLO PELLIZZARI
α
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.50 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25
Mtr 1.00 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.37
1.50 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.46
Cha 4.5e-05 0.0033 0.0048 0.00061 0.00063
Table 2. Standard deviation of prices in the last 100
trading sessions (normalized by p∗, percent values.)














































Figure 1. Left: price trajectory in a market populated
by 9% of M-traders using λ = 0.5. Right: price trajec-
tories in markets where 19% (upper) and 33% (lower) of
chartist traders are present, respectively. The time-series
are normalized by the equilibrium price that is shown
with a horizontal dashed line.
is converging to a constant value that can be diﬀerent from the equi-
librium price. This conclusion always holds in the simulated chartist
markets.
Loosely speaking, in the M-trader market there is only “convergence
in mean” while strict price convergence to a possibly “wrong” equilib-
rium level is the norm in a chartist setup.
3.2. Mispricing. As seen in Figure 1, some mispricing is present in
both our markets. This is an obvious source of allocative ineﬃciency
as it prevents agents to achieve an eﬃcient risk allocation. We can
measure the mispricing as |pT −p∗|/p∗ for each simulation and provideTOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 11
the average values4 in Table 3. The absolute percent deviation
5 from
p∗ is below 0.5% in all markets with M-traders. There is also some
evidence that the mispricing is increasing with λ. Observing that the
standard deviations reported in Table 2 are quite close to mispricing
ﬁgures, one can conclude that the deviation from the equilibrium price
is essentially due to the variance of the stochastic ﬂuctuations around
p∗, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.
α
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.50 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.15
Mtr 1.00 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.34
1.50 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.51
Cha 0.15 0.27 0.50 0.75 1.66
Table 3. Average relative mispricing |pT −p∗|/p∗ (per-
cent values).
While the mispricing is slowly increasing in the fraction α of the M-
traders, the presence of chartist agents is noticeable beyond a certain
threshold. The average mispricing is 0.5% when α = 0.3 and more
chartists cause the ﬁgures to increase up to 1.66%. The dynamics of
the averages, however, is not telling the whole story. Figure 2 shows a
non parametric estimate of the average mispricing together with a one
standard deviation “conﬁdence” band6.









5Taking the mean of (pT −p∗)/p∗ produces results that are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, as negative and positive deviations compensate and indeed there is no
reason in our framework to have unbalanced outcomes.
6Our results are obtained using Friedman’s “super smoother”, see
[Friedman and Stuetzle, 1981], but the ﬁndings are robust and virtually the
same with other smoothers. For example, using the loess polynomial ﬁtter



























































































































































































































Figure 2. Percent mispricing as a function of the frac-
tion of chartist α. The circles show the point values for
each simulation and the average, estimated non paramet-
rically, is shown with a solid line. The dashed lines show
the mean plus (minus) one standard deviation.
It is clear that the worst-case mispricing is much bigger than sug-
gested in Table 3: if α = 0.3, say, it is not uncommon for the mispricing
to reach roughly 1% despite an average value that is half this amount;
if the number of chartists is approaching 50% of the agents, the mis-
pricing can rather frequently exceed 2% or higher values. This evidence
is showing that large proportions of chartists can produce a substantial
mispricing and related episodes of ineﬃcient allocation. The amount
of the loss in wealth terms that is borne by the rational agents is still
to be quantiﬁed and the next subsection provides the details.
3.3. Wealth. The eﬀect of the presence of some M-traders or chartists
on the wealth of the remaining part of rational agents can be assessed
by the fraction of the fair share m(i,T)/m∗
i they are able to retain, see
Footnote 3. Table 4 reports the (averaged) percentage of fair share of
the rational traders in diﬀerent markets 7. In general, agents get slightly
more than 100% of their fair share, with the exception of situations
where some chartist traders are present.













and rR is the the set of indexes of Rational agents in the r-th simulation.TOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 13
α
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
100.01 100.02 100.03 100.04 100.06 0.50
(0.0071) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022)
100.02 100.06 100.10 100.16 100.23 Mtr 1.00
(0.011) (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023)
100.04 100.11 100.19 100.30 100.47 1.50
(0.018) (0.036) (0.047) (0.072) (0.048)
99.96 99.95 99.97 100.00 100.15 Cha
(0.014) (0.016) (0.047) (0.088) (0.28)
Table 4. Average percentage of fair share gained by
rational traders (standard deviation in parentheses).
There is no evidence that the action of M-traders produces a reduc-
tion of the average wealth of the rational agents in all the markets,
regardless of the values of α and λ. Indeed, the ﬁrst three rows suggest
surprisingly that an increment of α is beneﬁcial. Only in the presence
of chartists, the wealth drops below 100%. Again, average values do not
allow a deeper understanding of the wealth dynamics. Figure 3 depicts
the mean wealth (with standard deviations) in the chartist market.
l l l





l l l ll l l
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Figure 3. Average wealth of rational traders as a func-
tion of α (solid line) in a market populated by chartist
traders. The dashed lines show a conﬁdence interval (one
standard deviation away from the mean).
The graph shows a visible increase of the volatility around α = 0.4,
see also the parenthesized numbers in Table 4. Most of the simulations14 PAOLO PELLIZZARI
yield wealth ﬁgures that are below 100% of the fair share (exactly in
84/100 cases) and some entries in Table 4 are bigger than 100 only be-
cause of a few outlying samples. The fanning-out of simulated wealth’s
fractions is consistent with worst cases (for α ≥ 0.4) where the wealth
could drop to values close to 99%.
Overall, these results suggest that the wealth of rational traders is
not diminished by M-traders but can be compromised by sizable levels
of chartists. Both kinds of traders display some irrational traits, in
the peculiar sense given to the term in this paper. However, while the
former group is incorporating unbiased information in the evaluation
of the risky asset with limited contribution to the mispricing, the latter
set of traders is exploiting the common signal given by the price and, if
many chartists are active, their herding can produce notable deviations
from the equilibrium price with relevant reverberation on wealth.
3.4. Rational vs irrational. It is of interest to investigate whether
irrational traders can survive in the long term. Standard arguments
suggest that if subrational traders had steadily worse results than ra-
tional agents, they would evaporate given enough time, say because
they learn to correctly evaluate the asset. A comparison is performed
by looking at the diﬀerence of the average fractions of fair share that
is gained by the two groups and is shown in the top panel8 of Table
5. Positive entries mean that rational traders get a bigger portion of
their fair share than the subrational agents. As all the entries are pos-
itive in the top panel, we can conclude that rational agents always get
“more” than irrational ones (even if they may get less than 100% as
seen before).
A perhaps fairer comparison, however, should take into account that
subrational agents coherently compute their certainty equivalents using
the (possibly) wrong parameter µ(i,T) instead of the correct µ. The
lower part of Table 5 shows the (averaged) diﬀerence of the fraction of
fair share of the rational traders9 with the same quantity as perceived
by subrational agents. As expected, little is changing for M-traders,






















where rR and rS denote the set of indexes of Rational and Subrational agents,
respectively.





















9It might be worth noticing that, being µ(i,T) ≡ µ for rational traders, we have
that π(i,T) ≡ m(i,T).TOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 15
Diﬀerence of fair shares (rational-subrational)
α
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.50 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Mtr 1.00 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.4 0.47
1.50 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.76 0.94
Cha 1.65 1.65 1.75 1.87 2.22
Diﬀerence of perceived fair shares
α
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.50 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11
Mtr 1.00 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.45
1.50 0.53 0.57 0.65 0.75 0.91
Cha -2.70 -2.07 -1.78 -1.19 -0.11
Table 5. Top panel: diﬀerence of average fractions of
fair share gained by rational and irrational traders (per-
cent values). Bottom panel: diﬀerence of average frac-
tions of fair share gained by rational agents and fair share
perceived by subrational traders (percent values).
whose perceived certainty equivalent is on average equal to ﬁnal one,
being E[µ(i,t)] = µ.
More interestingly, as chartist agents have often vastly incorrect es-
timates of the fundamental value, i.e. µ(i,t) 6= µ, their perceived
certainty equivalent can be diﬀerent from m∗
i. The last row of the bot-
tom panel of Table 5, in fact, shows that all populations of chartists
perceive a certainty equivalent that is often considerably bigger than
the fair share of the rational traders. As seen in Figure 4, moreover,
the fewer the chartists the bigger is the perceived advantage. A styl-
ized learning argument in a repeated game setting may then be used to
argue that if a handful of irrational chartists are initially present, more
agents could be attracted to this particular dark side of subrational
behavior. The process should naturally extinguish itself when α has
reached a value exceeding 0.4.
4. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of an exchange economy (with a contin-
uous double auction) populated by some rational CARA-normal agents
and subrational traders that have the same form of demand function
but do not know one relevant parameter. We deﬁne two ways to build
beliefs, based on private informative signals (M-traders) and on the use
of the publicly observable price (chartists).16 PAOLO PELLIZZARI
















































































































































Figure 4. Perceived (average) fraction of fair shared
earned by the chartist agents, solid line. The dashed
lines show a conﬁdence interval (one standard deviation
away from the mean).
Aiming to assess the eﬀects of varying proportions α of subrational
traders on the the remaining part of rational agents, we compare the
fraction of fair share that is conserved by them despite the presence of
potentially disruptive subrational partners.
We show that M-traders do not diminish the fair share of the ra-
tional agents (that is, the optimal risk-adjusted wealth that a rational
trader should be given for his capability to bear risk is unchanged or
even slightly increased). M-traders incorporate private unbiased infor-
mation in their limit prices which, albeit noisy, oﬀer valuable liquid-
ity at correct (average) levels to the rational buyers/sellers. On the
contrary, chartists take the extreme approach to use the price as the
unique determinant of fundamental value. Even if the estimate they
compute would be correct in equilibrium (ex-post), they can push the
price to the wrong level and they implicitly herd on a common sig-
nal (the observed price is unique so everyone is using the same piece
of information). This produces at times considerable mispricings and
wealth losses as big as 1% can be borne by the rational agents.
Moreover, chartists keep using subrational behavior because their
perceived wealth is bigger than the one owned by the rational group (a
similar argument is in [De Long et al., 1990]). Hence, in an evolving
setting we can conjecture that the number of chartists might increase
to reach 40 or 50% of the total number of agents. Disappointingly,
these quotas are close to the ones where the toll they impose on the
others is greater.TOLL OF SUBRATIONAL TRADING 17
The model has not yet reached the level of sophistication that would
suggest a serious calibration exercise but, if we steer this conclusion
toward more perilous horizons, some research avenues could be sug-
gested.
First, chartist agents diﬀer from M-traders because they huddle to-
gether but it is conceivable that private signals as well may be corre-
lated or common. If this is the case, M-traders too would behave in
a more or less coordinated fashion whose eﬀect should be clariﬁed in
future work.
Second, we could assert that there is no rational agent in the real
markets (at least, not as rational as needed in order to know the pa-
rameters and functional form of the density of the risky asset and the
preferences of the other agents). Put in another way, the rational agents
should be replaced in the model by subrational M-traders who still has
to deal with nasty chartists. The former use (rather rationally?) the
available information to construct their own belief on the fundamental
value, while the latter exploit the pseudo-content of the prices.
In third place, there is no reason why subrational agents should
adjust their µ(i,t) alone. In actual markets, the dispersion of proﬁts
may be much more diﬃcult to know than the average. It is plausible
that subrational agents engaged in simultaneous estimation of both
parameters µ and τ could fuel much bigger market sparkles and provide
better ﬁt to realistic stylized facts.
The policy implications of this work are, at this stage, rather grim.
Eradication of chartism is diﬃcult due to the perceived high levels
of certainty equivalent that results from subrational behaviour. To-
gether with the practical diﬃculties in detecting “deviant” conducts,
this makes it diﬃcult for institutions to devise painless solutions.
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